This article discusses the limits of the transaction cost explanation of the existence of the firm. It develops three simple models that compare the profitability of firms and markets, two without transaction costs related to market trading. In both firms and markets it is assumed that skills increase due to a static specialisation effect. In addition, in the first two models, firms benefit from firm-specific capabilities referring to skill-enhancement due to the learning environment of the firm. On the other hand, organisation by the firm requires costly monitoring. In the first model, organisation by the market is more profitable unless monitoring costs are countered by the existence of firm-specific capabilities. The second odel introduces dynamic learning effects, in which case some firms may, irrespective of monitoring costs, always turn out to be more profitable than the comparable market organisation. The third model involves a preliminary attempt to establish an empirical methodology for comparing the relative importance of transaction cost and capabilities explanations for the existence of the firm. There is no a priori reason to assume the supremacy of one type of explanation over the other. It is argued that a conjoint research program, encompassing both transaction cost and competence-based approaches, must be developed and tested empirically.
Introduction
In recent years, two prominent approaches have emerged to the theory of the firm. On the one hand, there is the transaction cost approach, associated with Ronald Coase (1937) , Oliver Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 and others. On the other hand, there is the variously entitled, resource-based, competence-based or capabilities approach to theory of the firm, associated with a variety of authors. 2 To some extent, however, debate between these rival approaches has become bogged down in empirical and conceptual difficulties.
The existing empirical literature involves contrasting claims. While Williamson (1999 Williamson ( , p. 1092 claims that the empirical work is 'broadly corroborative' of the transaction cost approach, Peter Moran and Sumantra Ghoshal (1996) are sceptical of this evidence. Arguably, some of the empirical relationships -such as that between asset specificity and vertical integration -are capable of explanation from both a competence-based and transaction cost perspective. One aim of the present article is to help to disentangle some of the conceptual difficulties involved in making empirical tests of the two different types of theory.
The present paper focuses on the conceptual and theoretical side of the problem. It is argued that there is no a priori reason to assume the supremacy of one type of explanation over the other. Three simple models are developed that compare the profitability of firms and markets, two without transaction costs related to market trading. In both firms and markets it is assumed that skills increase due to a static specialisation effect. In addition, in the first two models, firms benefit from firm-specific capabilities referring to skill-enhancement due to the learning environment of the firm. On the other hand, organisation by the firm requires costly monitoring.
The first model compares organisation by firm and market only in terms of static effects. Not surprisingly, we find that organisation by the market is more profitable unless monitoring costs are countered by the existence of firm-specific capabilities. The second model includes dynamic learning effects and, to avoid arbitrary results, uses an identical specification of these effects in markets and firms. When dynamic learning effects augment firm-specific capabilities, some firms may, irrespective of monitoring costs, always turn out to be more profitable than the comparable market organisation. The third model introduces transaction costs and removes firm-specific learning effects. It is shown that, even in the presence of other learning effects, the firm-market boundary can remain constant. It is suggested that this result may help establish an empirical methodology for comparing the relative importance of transaction cost and capabilities explanations.
These results indicate that dynamic learning effects may reinforce capabilities-based explanations for the existence and relative profitability of firms. It is argued that a conjoint research program, encompassing both transaction cost and competence-based approaches, must be developed and tested empirically. It is also suggested that, in order to further the debate, the concept of transaction cost now urgently requires a precise and restricted definition.
For reasons that will become evident later below, it is important at this stage to review briefly Coase's argument, before mention of some of the later contributions to the transaction cost literature. These issues are raised in section 2. Section 3 develops an argument for the existence of firm-specific learning, drawing on established arguments in organisation studies and elsewhere. Section 4 lays out the heuristic model and section 5 considers some objections to the main argument. It is accepted that transaction costs may be part of the explanation for the existence of the firm but that problems arise when the argument becomes non-falsifiable and universal. However, a hybrid theory, combining transaction cost with capabilities-based approaches, may be viable. If so, some demarcation tests are required to consider whether firm-specific learning effects or transaction costs are more important in specific empirical circumstances. Section 6 makes some preliminary and incomplete suggestions towards such an empirical methodology. Section 7 concludes the essay.
Some Conceptual Problems with Existing Theory
In his original paper, Coase did not actually use the term 'transaction cost'. Instead, he used phrases such as 'contract costs', 'marketing costs' and 'cost of using the price mechanism'. Nevertheless, he clearly argued that:
Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is co-ordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market. Within a firm, these market transactions are eliminated and in place of the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who directs production. … the distinguishing mark of the firm is the supersession of the price mechanism. … The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism. (Coase, 1937, pp. 388-90) A notable feature of Coase's argument is his clear demarcation of the market from the firm, with the 'price mechanism' on the one hand and its 'supersession' on the other. For Coase the alternative to the firm is the coordination of individuals by the market, each being his or her 'own master ' (p. 390 ). In such a market, this 'independent contractor' sells the 'fruits of his labour' rather than hiring out his time for a wage (Coase, 1937, p. 404; quoting Blatt) . Accordingly, coordination of production by the market involves many separate contracts between self-employed contractors. Instead, in the case of the firm:
It is true that contracts are not eliminated when there is a firm but they are greatly reduced. … For this series of contracts is substituted one. (Coase, 1937, p. 391) Accordingly, contracting or transaction costs exist both inside and outside the firm but, for Coase, the existence of the firm is associated with lower transaction costs.
In the transaction cost literature, since Coase's article, there has been some controversy over the application of the concept of transaction cost. To a significant degree, the concept of 'transaction cost' has been widened and diluted compared with Coase's 'marketing cost'. It is now widely recognised that a danger in such explanations is that 'transaction costs' are not only empirically difficult to measure, but also that the concept has a potentially elastic quality. It can cover a range of possible phenomena -inside and outside the firm -and it sometimes acts as a 'catch-all phrase' (Dahlman, 1979, p. 144) . As Williamson (1995, p. 33 ) himself has noted:
There is nonetheless a grave problem with broad, elastic and plausible concepts -of which 'transaction costs' is one and 'power' is another -in that they lend themselves to ex post rationalization. Concepts that explain everything explain nothing.
A danger here is that the concept of transaction cost is defined too broadly. If it is defined as the cost of defining, negotiating, monitoring and enforcing all contracts then it is not confined to the market. With an overly broad definition, a transaction cost is not restricted to the Coasean 'cost of using the price mechanism'. It would also include the costs associated with the monitoring and enforcement of contracts of employment within the firm. Hence, against the letter and spirit of Coase's (1937) article, organisation and management costs also become 'transaction costs'. Harold Demsetz (1988, p. 144) has rightly reacted against this conflation:
Recent writings on the theory of the firm sometimes use transaction costs to refer indiscriminately to organizational costs and whether these arise from within the firm or across the market.
Clearly, there is a need for the concept of a transaction cost to be limited and carefully defined. It is not our objective here to establish an adequate and persuasive definition, but we do separate two types of cost that in recent writings have been gathered under the 'catch-all' transaction cost label. One the one hand, there are costs associated with the definition, negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of the employment contract. They include the costs involved in hiring, organising, monitoring and managing the human resources within the firm. On the other hand, there are costs associated with the definition, negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of contracts for other services and goods, in the sphere of markets or exchange. 3 Following Demsetz (1988, p. 145) , we identify a problem in the standard transaction cost explanation. If market-related transaction costs are zero, yet the cost of the management of human resources within the firm is positive, then 'the transaction cost theory predicts the demise of the firm.' We agree with Demsetz, that this conclusion is wrong and that it suggests some problems with the transaction cost theory.
However, we do not find Demsetz's own alternative explanation to be satisfactory. For Demsetz (p. 146) : 'Multiperson firms are fully consistent with zero transaction cost if management is subject to scale economies.' Accordingly, Demsetz suggests that managerial economies of scale could explain the decision of the firm to make a component in-house rather than buying from another firm. But explaining the make-or-buy decision is not quite the same thing as explaining the existence of a firm.
Can managerial economies of scale explain the existence of a firm rather than of a marketcoordinated collection of self-employed producers? For this explanation to work, what Demsetz calls 'management costs' must be greater per worker in the case of self-employed producers than in the case of employees within a firm. There are two major problems with this. First, self-employment means self-management, and the consequent absence of many costs associated with the coordination, organisation and management of human resources. As far as the performance of work is concerned, the self-employee is 'principal' and 'agent' rolled into one. The idea that 'management costs' are greater per worker in the case of selfemployed producers than in the case of employees within a firm is both implausible and confusing. Second, by failing to confine the concept of 'management cost' adequately, Demsetz simply shifts onto the concept the catch-all characteristics that the 'transaction cost' concept has already acquired.
In section 4 of this article we develop a simple heuristic model in which all transaction costs -in the restricted sense of the 'marketing costs' -are zero. (Positive transaction costs are introduced in section 6.) These transaction or 'marketing' costs are confined to the definition, negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of all contracts except employment contracts. We also assume that the cost of hiring workers and establishing their formal contracts is also zero.
In contrast, positive costs of monitoring and managing labour, inside the firm, are included in our model. 4 For brevity we refer to these as 'monitoring costs'. However, for reasons of both plausibility and heuristic force, we assume that these monitoring costs are always greater in a firm with N employees than in a market with N self-employed producers, for all positive N. So, even if monitoring costs are (perhaps misleadingly) included under the label of 'transaction costs', then we assume that these costs are always greater within the firm. Crucially, with these assumptions and definitions, a purely transaction cost explanation would be unable to explain the existence of the firm.
However, we give reasons, in both static and dynamic cases, for the possible existence of the firm, with these assumptions. Hence we place some possible limits on the transaction cost explanation. This does not necessarily mean that the transaction cost explanation is wrong but that it in some circumstances it is insufficient: it may have to be combined with other explanatory factors. This holds up the possibility of a 'hybrid' theory of the firm, combining transaction cost with capabilities-based explanations. The relative importance of each type of explanation may depend on concrete circumstances. Such hybrid explanations are foreshadowed by the work of Richard Langlois (1992) , David Teece and Gary Pisano (1994) and others.
Before we outline our heuristic model we shall briefly explain and motivate our (additional) explanation for the existence of firms. In the static case our argument depends on the existence of a firm-specific learning effect which is strictly dependent upon the number of workers in the firm. The argument is that the existence of the firm can enhance individual skills or capabilities by providing a repository of tacit and codifiable knowledge, embodied in organisational structures and routines. In short, the firm may provide a learning environment in which skills may be enhanced.
A dynamic effect is superimposed upon this, where at each activity level, skills are augmented due to time-dependent learning effects, such as learning-by-doing. Again for heuristic reasons, the form of this time-dependent process is assumed to be identical in firms and markets. The intention is to show in a dynamic context how learning can further increase the possibilities for the existence of the firm, even if dynamic learning effects in firms and markets are functionally identical.
The argument for this firm-specific learning effect is presented in the following section. It draws on established arguments in organisation studies and elsewhere.
Corporate Culture and Organisational Learning
The aim of this section is to outline a plausible mechanism whereby workers in firms gain learning advantages due to organisational and cultural attributes of the firm that are not found on markets.
Arguments for such a mechanism are plentiful in studies of organisation behaviour and industrial psychology, as well as in evolutionary economics. For brevity, we discuss a small but indicative subset of these literatures. 5 The key point is that the firm provides an organisational environment, consisting of routines, images and stored information, which can enhance the capabilities of workers. 6 Such routines, images and stored information depend on the existence of the organisation per se, and are not found to the same degree in a market context. Accordingly, even if knowledge is regarded as an individual phenomenon, existing solely in the memory traces of individuals, then the organisation provides a structured environment consisting largely of routinised practices that can augment individual skills. Accordingly, even if knowledge and skills are individual phenomena, the organisational whole is more than the sum of its individual parts. Furthermore, this structured and routinised environment is not present to the same degree in a market context.
As Chris Argyris and Donald Schön (1996, p. 8) argue, to become an organisation, a group must: '1. devise agreed-upon procedures for making decisions in the name of the collectivity, 2. delegate to individuals the authority to act for the collectivity, and 3. set boundaries between the collectivity and the rest of the world.' Crucially, in the case of the firm, the second condition here involves the firm acting as a singular 'legal person' in the name of the firm as a whole. In contrast, in the market, every individual can act as a legal person in his or her own right. It is the singularity of legal personhood that is one of the key demarcating features between the firm and a market, and provides a legal basis for the establishment of integrated procedures of delegation, and for the establishment of the firm's boundaries. 7 Argyris and Schön (1996) refer to concepts of 'organisational knowledge' and 'organizational learning' that are nevertheless consistent with a view that knowledge is ultimately traceable to the memories or capacities of individuals. Even if this is the case, the organisation itself is more than the sum of its individual members:
First, organizations function in several ways as holding environments for knowledge … in an organization's files, which record its actions, decisions, regulations, and policies … in physical objects that members use as references and guideposts as they go about their business. … Second, organizations directly represent knowledge in the sense that they embody strategies for performing complex tasks … Organizational knowledge is embedded in routines and practices which may be inspected and decoded even when the individuals who carry them out are unable to put them into words. (Argyris and Schön, 1996, pp. 12-13) Accordingly, learning becomes organisational when it is not only embedded in the minds of its members, but also when it is incorporated in the structures, files or routines of the organisation itself. The mark of organisational learning is a change in the environment in which the individuals operate, leading to enhanced individual or organisational capabilities.
Scott Cook and Dvora Yanow (1993) develop a similar argument, focusing also on corporate culture as a basis for the preservation and enhancement of capabilities. For them, organisation learning is more than the cognitions of individuals. It involves the development of cultural features, constituted in intersubjective meanings and expressed in common practices. It is through such meaning-bearing activities, languages and objects that knowledge is reproduced and transmitted in the firm. Much of this knowledge is tacit and beyond codifiable description.
Works in other disciplines take a complementary view. Work in 'evolutionary economics' is particularly apposite here. Famously, Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter (1982) consider the firm's routines as repositories of knowledge. Luigi Marengo (1992) and others explicitly incorporate the concept of organisational learning into the theory of the firm. David Lane (1996) et al, develop the concept of 'generative relationships'. These social relationships are part of the make-up of a firm: they are part of the corporate environment in which individuals work. Just as individuals adapt to their environment, interactions amongst the participants in a 'generative relationship' can change the way the participants conceive of the world and act in it. They give rise to new capabilities and are partly emergent, in the sense that what develops is not predictable from knowledge of interacting individuals alone. The attributions, competences and entities that are constructed from interactions cannot be predicted from knowledge of the participating agents alone, without knowledge of the structure and history of the interactions that constitute the generative relationships.
Historically, the capacity of the firm to enhance individual capabilities has operated in different ways. In a modern, knowledge-intensive firm, cultural mechanisms of corporate identification, involvement and trust may often be important in creating the learning environment in which productivity is increased. However, in earlier and other incarnations, the firm may increase productivity largely by exercising disciplinary control over the pace and manner of work. Stephen Marglin (1974) famously argued that the emergence of the firm during the Industrial Revolution was a result of the exercise of the power of the capitalist over the workers. Slightly differently, we argue that in this period, managerial power was a means by which the firm could sometimes enhance productivity. The exercise of power is not a sufficient condition for the existence of the firm. However, if managerial power leads to increases in productivity that are not obtainable outside the firm, then managerial power is part of the explanation of the existence and survival of the firm. Managerial power can be perceived as a way to control and direct some of the processes of learning within the firm. In some contexts it may achieve this by establishing habits of punctuality and diligence, by instilling other norms, by structuring the interaction among workers, by creating the possibility of organisational experiments and so on. Accordingly, we focus on the general processes of firm-specific learning deriving from the organisational environment of the firm, irrespective of whether or not this environment is characterised by trust, consensus, participation, hierarchy or managerial despotism. Whether motivated by rod, reward or respect, a form of firm-specific learning may take place.
The contributions from organisation studies, industrial psychology, economic history and evolutionary economics differ in several points of analytical detail. Much of the discourse therein covers additional issues that are at best of tangential interest here. The point, however, is that we may extract from this body of work a core idea that is of importance for the present article. It depends upon the following, minimal assumptions:
1. Individual capabilities are not fixed but are, in part, adaptations to an environment.
2. The environment facing individuals within a firm is different from the environment found in the market.
3. Firms are made up of routines and structures that provide better ways of organising work and tacit or codifiable knowledge and can enhance capabilities or skills.
4. The possibility exists under certain conditions that these skill enhancements can be greater in a firm rather than in a market environment.
Essentially, the core idea is that the firm provides an environment that can enhance worker skills and performance, and in some circumstances this enhancement will be greater than in the alternative, market-based, governance mode.
We fully accept that some forms of learning are specific to markets, rather than firms. Emphatically, the market can also foster learning capabilities. People adapt to a market environment by learning specific skills, such as pecuniary judgement, marketing technique or innovative foresight. Furthermore, some learning found in organisations can be transferred to a market context. We are concerned here, nevertheless, with the possibility that the firm may have the capacity, under some conditions, to enlarge average individual capabilities more than they are enlarged on the market. Whether or not this possibility happens in reality is properly a matter of empirical investigation -not of theoretical or ideological dogma.
As long as this possibility exists, the existence of some firms can be explained even if transaction costs have no significant effect. This conclusion has been reached already in the capabilities literature on the firm. For example, as Nicolai Foss (1996, p. 18) argues: 'firms exist because they can more efficiently coordinate collective learning processes than market organization is able to'. What we offer here is an explanation and formalisation of the mechanism that can give rise to this firm-based advantage under specific conditions.
Why Some Firms May Exist: A Heuristic Model
This model has the following features:
(1) Following Coase (1937) , production can take place in two alternative forms of economic organisation: the firm or the market.
(2) We assume N workers with homogenous skills. Skills are homogenous within firms and markets but will, in the presence of firm-specific capabilities, differ between the two forms of economic organisation.
(3) The skill levels in firms and markets will result from three distinct effects: (3.1) specialisation, (3.2) firm-specific capabilities, and (3.3) dynamic learning-effects. Skillenhancement due to specialisation and firm-specific effects is treated as static in nature whereas the augmentation of skills due to learning is dynamic.
Static specialisation effects in firms and markets. It is assumed -along with Adam
Smith in the Wealth of Nations -that as the number of workers is increased, greater specialisation gives rise to enhanced skills. We assume that the functional form of this specialisation effect is identical in firms and markets. With this static effect it is assumed that as the number of workers is increased, then there is a greater division of labour and the productivity of each worker increases due to specialisation. As noted below, a dynamic effect compounds this by assuming a cumulative growth in these skill levels through time.
3.2 Firm-specific capabilities. Skill-enhancement in firms is caused by a firm-specific learning effect -explained below -that is strictly dependent upon the number of workers. We refer to this effect as capabilities and treat it here as static in nature.
3.3 Learning dynamics in firms and markets. Both in firms and markets an initial skill-level, realised at a given number of workers, is augmented due to a time-effect that reflects a dynamic learning process, strictly independent from the static effects. The functional form of the learning process is identical in firms and markets. Following an identical specification of this learning process, firms also augment their capabilities.
(4) We assume that organisation by the firm requires monitoring. Because of direct contracting between workers and buyers and the absence of the principal-agent problems associated with an employment relation, organisation by the market requires less monitoring. Without loss of generality, we model the difference between firms and markets by rescaling the monitoring costs in markets to zero.
The model includes the following non-negative variables: 
Static Specialisation and Firm-Specific Capabilities
In the market, the N workers are self-employed producers. However, they do not own any capital goods and they enter into contracts for defined services with an entrepreneur. This is a contract for services rather than an employment contract. Remuneration is equivalent to the market wage rate for the skill level involved. 8
Consider skill enhancement due to specialisation. The individual skill-level increases in N. For simplicity, we assume a linear form where, at activity level N, the individual skill level is given by α N , where α 1 is a given constant:
Remuneration per worker remains in proportion to the skill level. For simplicity, we also assume that capital costs are also proportional to skill levels. This gives the following cost function:
The output function is as follows:
There are no monitoring costs in the market, so entrepreneurial profits at activity level N are simply:
Hence profits per worker are:
Now consider the organisation of production by the firm. The model here follows the specification for the market apart from the addition of firm-specific capabilities. These are strictly dependent upon the number of workers in the firm. The cost and production functions are identical to those in the market.
In the firm the additional component is a function f(N) which captures the additional, firmspecific capabilities resulting from the effects of the firm's learning environment, including its culture and routines. This effect is realised for some values of N. f(N) is any function where f(1)=0, and for all N>0, f(N)>0 and f´(N)>0. It could, for example, be a logistic curve. In figure 1 below we assume a quasi-logistic function of the following type:
where d and e are given constants. In general, the combined effect of skill enhancement due to specialisation and to firm-specific capabilities has the form:
In addition, the following functions apply. The cost function is:
The production function is:
The monitoring function is:
Where m and a are positive constants. Typically, the average cost of monitoring each worker declines as N increases, i.e. a<1. Profit at employment level N is:
Profits per worker are:
We now consider the situations where firms are more profitable than markets, for some level of N. From the above expressions for profits per worker in firms and markets, profits in the firm will be greater than profits in the market, if and only if:
Assume that firm-specific capabilities are present so f(N)>0 for some N. Then, for a sufficiently low m > 0 the above condition is always fulfilled and profits in the firm will be greater than profits in the market. Note, however, that this may require m being close to zero, and this is perhaps an implausible condition. Furthermore, note that in the absence of firmspecific capabilities given by f(N), organisation by the market is always more profitable than organisation by the firm since the latter situation always entails positive monitoring costs.
Dynamic Learning Effects in Firms and Markets
We denote the skill-level of firms and markets by α N (F) and α N (M), respectively, and the difference between the two forms of organisation as:
At each activity level, skills are augmented due to time-dependent learning effects. This process is assumed to be identical in form in both firms and markets, so the only difference between the two modes of organisation is the difference in skill levels for a given N (∆α N ).
Clearly, any substantial labour turnover in the firm is likely to reduce any firm specific learning effects. To dramatise the difference between the firm and the market, we assume that such turnover effects are small enough to sustain firm-specific learning. A more sophisticated model would take labour turnover into account.
The augmentation of the difference in skill-enhancement between firms and markets is given by: ∆α N,t /dt = g(t) ⇒ ∆α N,t = ∆α N,t 0 + ∫g(t)dt
Organisation by the firm is more profitable than organisation by the market in situations which satisfy:
Several classes of functions g(t) satisfy this condition, i.e. that ∫g(t)dt is sufficiently high for some N. For illustration, consider the following classical learning function. Suppose, at employment level N, the skill-level at time t (α N,t ), both in firms and markets, is given by the following typical learning function: 9 α N,t = cα N,t-1 b where b and c are positive constants. This learning function is based on the assumption of cumulative learning-by-doing with a zero-turnover workforce. With this assumption the difference in learning between firms and markets of scale N is given by:
In this situation, organization by the firm is more profitable when: Thus, for any m and [mN a-1 /(PQ -(w + k))], organisation by the firm can be more profitable than organisation by the market since a sufficiently high value of c may be chosen to satisfy the above condition. Conversely, for a sufficiently high value of c, the value of b may be increased towards 1 from below to obtain an identical result.
As a result, in this dynamic context, the skill-enhancement due to learning increases the range of situations in which firms are more profitable than markets.
When the learning process is strong enough (entails a sufficiently high skill-enhancement), it does not matter if the monitoring costs in the first period place a comparative disadvantage on the firm or even entail negative profits for some period.
In fact, since α N,t 0 (F)> α N,t 0 (M) for some b and c for any function f(N) -defined so f(N)>0 and f´(N)>0 for some N -it is always possible that organisation by the firm is more profitable than organisation by the market for some range of N.
That is, in the presence of firm-specific capabilities, given by f(N), and dynamic learning effects, organisation by the firm may always turn out to be more profitable than organisation by the market even when monitoring costs place an initial comparative disadvantage on firms. This point is illustrated in Figure 1 below. Note that the firm-market boundary shifts as a result of dynamic learning effects. In the above example it shifts rapidly to the left, as a result of the existence of enhanced firmspecific learning capabilities. The result is that smaller firms become more viable, as firmspecific learning proceeds. A new subset of smaller firms emerges within the industry.
Some Possible Reactions
In line with the above heuristic model, we contend that there are reasons for firms to exist even if transaction costs are zero or insignificant. Furthermore, these reasons may be enhanced in the context of dynamic learning effects. This does not mean that transaction costs are unimportant in the real world but that they may provide only part of the explanation for the existence of the firm. This explanatory shortfall is likely to be greater in contexts where firm-specific learning is significant. Principally, we anticipate two possible reactions to this argument.
It could be alleged that firm-specific learning effects are always insignificant.
The first reaction is implausible and dogmatic, in that an a priori denial of the possibility of firm-specific effects goes against much prime facie evidence to the contrary. In the managerial literature, from Taylorist 'scientific management' on, there is much case study and other evidence of the positive effects of firm organisation on productivity. Although this evidence does not show clearly that all the phenomena involved are necessarily and exclusively firm-specific, it is important evidence nevertheless. Clearly more empirical work is required. Above all, the significance and degree of firm-specific effects is an empirical matter and cannot be asserted or denied a priori.
It is true that in the above heuristic model the existence of a firm depends on the supposition of the firm-specific effects captured in the f(N) function, as a necessary but not sufficient condition. We do not assume dogmatically the existence of such effects. We assert that if such effects exist then they may be sufficient to explain the existence of the firm. The determination of the existence of effects along these lines is an empirical matter. We freely admit that if such effects are small, then a greater burden of the explanation for the existence of the firm may shift to transaction costs. The onus is on supporters of the argument that all firms are always explained by transaction costs to show that effects depending on a f(N) function are generally insignificant.
It could be alleged that firm-specific effects are always the result of 'transactions' within the firm. These transactions incur costs from managing, monitoring and organising labour and other resources. It could be argued that the existence of firm-specific effects
simply follows from the fact that the cost of managing, monitoring and organising a specified set of resources, to achieve a specified level of productivity, is lower in the firm than it is in the market. Hence firm-specific effects can be 'explained' in 'transaction cost' terms. As a result, lower transaction costs may still be sufficient to 'explain' the existence of the firm.
In the case of this second statement, a number of points can be made. First, it involves a significant departure from the position advanced by Coase (1937) himself, as well as that of others, such as Demsetz (1988) . Coase saw the explanation of the existence of the firm in terms of 'marketing costs' and the 'costs of using the price mechanism'. In his 1937 paper he did not extend this notion of cost to cover what might be called 'managerial transactions '. 10 Of course, it is possible to adopt different definitions. Coase (1988) himself has changed his position somewhat. The reader may wish to define 'transaction cost' as applying to transactions both within and between firms. However, if this course is followed to the point of the second statement, then the concept of transaction cost is stretched to the point where the 'transaction cost explanation' of the existence of the firm is incapable of falsification. No conceivable situation, with surviving and profitable firms, could fail to be 'explained' in terms of 'transaction costs' so widely conceived. We cannot think of a real world situation that could falsify such a 'theory'. With the second statement, the concept of transaction cost has become a 'catch-all phrase' and the transaction cost explanation has become unfalsifiable and unassailable.
This position is hardly consistent with the existence of a research programme that has attempted to put the transaction cost explanation to the test. If the theory is unfalsifiable, then such a research programme is unnecessary; claims of corroboration would follow automatically from the nature of the theory rather than from any empirical enquiry.
Even if 'transaction cost' is defined broadly, to avoid the above problems it is necessary to distinguish between 'transaction costs' within the firm and 'transaction costs' that are incurred by agents on the market. Two types of 'transaction cost' must be established.
In contrast, by defining the concept of transaction cost in accord with the sentiments of both Coase (1937) and Demsetz (1988) we have outlined some plausible circumstances in which the transaction cost explanation might break down, with the use of a simple heuristic model. It is far more fruitful to concentrate on the limits and potential of a possible explanation rather than to redefine it in a way that it seemingly 'explains' everything, but to the point of unfalsifiability.
Another problem arises with the second objection. Its included statement above -that all transaction costs, inclusive of managerial costs, are lower in the firm than in the marketcould involve a comparison of two states, one of which may be implausible. To make a valid comparison between firm and market we have to consider all the 'transaction costs' associated with the same specified set of resources in both the firm and the market. Furthermore, once we admit the possibility of learning-by-doing then we have to consider situations where output per worker is the same. Otherwise, differences in learning levels will affect the result. However, if firm-specific learning effects are significant then it may not be feasible to achieve a comparable level of productivity on the market. If not, then this would simply mean that the cost of using the market mode of organisation was infinite. The 'transaction cost' argument would not be logically invalidated but questions must be raised about the meaningfulness of a cost comparison of this type when one set of costs is driven to infinity. It is like explaining the human failure to develop a perpetual motion machine in terms of the excessive cost of doing so, rather than (in this case) in terms of its defiance of the laws of physics.
Steps Towards an Empirical Methodology
Accepting that the transaction cost explanation may be part of the explanation for the existence of some firms but that firms can exist for other reasons, some methodology is required to examine real-world cases. However, such examinations are only meaningful if the transaction cost explanation is framed in limited and falsifiable terms.
The problem of conjoint and comparative testing of transaction cost and capabilities-type explanations for the existence of firms has been largely neglected in the literature. 11 We make some highly preliminary and incomplete suggestions towards future work that may rectify this deficiency. We do not claim to provide an adequate methodology here.
Assume that transaction costs (T) are proportional to the number of possible pairwise connections between N workers (N (N -1) ). Hence
Where s is a positive constant. This new function T N enters into the analysis with an effect alongside but of opposite sign to the monitoring function M N . Whereas higher monitoring costs favour the market, higher values of T make the formation of the firm more likely. Where previously there was the expression mN a , this must be replaced by the expression
Organization by the firm is more profitable than organization by the market in situations which satisfy:
The next step is to assume the extreme case where there is no firm-specific learning. Hence ∆α N,t = 0.
Under these conditions, organization by the firm is more profitable than organization by the market when:
With a<2 the firm becomes relatively more profitable with increasing values of N. The boundary point at which the firm and market are equally profitable is when s(N -1) = mN a-1 .
Accordingly, for any given values of a, m and s, there may exist a positive value of N that satisfies the above condition, i.e. transaction and monitoring costs are equal. If so, then the firm and the market will be equally profitable. More generally:
Clearly, in the absence of firm-specific learning, transaction costs must be positive and greater than monitoring costs for firms to exist. The crucial point to note is that, under these assumptions -including the absence of firmspecific learning -the latter expressions relating to the boundary between firm and market are independent of other learning effects as well. The existence of (equal) static specialisation effects in firms and markets, and (equal) learning dynamics in firms and markets, does not lead to any dynamic shift in the firm-market boundary. Accordingly, if firm-specific learning effects are zero, and other factors are held constant, then the boundary between the firm and the market does not shift.
Note that this result would also apply if the monitoring and transaction cost functions had a different form to those assumed above. Figure 2 provides a specific illustration, formed by adding transaction costs to the model on figure 1. Note the static firm-market boundary.
Given the static firm-market boundary illustrated in figure 2, it may be possible to develop an empirical methodology to discern whether transaction costs or firm-specific learning are more important in specific cases in the real world. Assume that in an industry we observe little change in the size (measured in terms of employment) distribution of firms and also little change in the proportion of self-employed workers in that industry. One possible explanation of this phenomenon could be that firm-specific learning effects are small or insignificant.
In contrast, if we observe a declining proportion of self-employed workers and changes in the size distribution of firms, including an increasing proportion of firms below a specific size, then this could be evidence of a shifting firm-market boundary and hence also of significant firm-specific learning effects. In fact, there is evidence since the late 1970s of increasing relative numbers of small firms, measured by employment, in several industrialised countries (Loveman and Sengenberger, 1991; Lui and Yang, 2000) .
The problem, however, is that the observed phenomena could be explained by other causal processes. For example, a static firm-market boundary could result from decreasing transaction costs and increasing and compensating firm-specific learning effects. In which case the inference of insignificant firm-specific learning effects would be invalid. This example suggests that direct measurement of some other variables -such as learning -might be required to interpret changes in size distribution correctly.
If these problems can be overcome, then it would be advisable to study shifts in the firmmarket boundary over relatively short periods of time. Over longer time periods, there could be substantial changes in technology or capital investment. These could impinge on profitability and the firm-market boundary, and thereby complicate any interpretation of the observations. Initial research would ideally focus on industries where there is relatively slow technical change.
In reality, a static firm-market boundary is unlikely. In the presence of firm-specific learning, a static firm-market boundary requires the amount of such learning in each period to be compensated precisely by the required decrease of transaction costs in each period. The likelihood that this happens successively is very small.
A much more sophisticated methodology would be required to isolate other factors impinging on the firm-market boundary. This is why our empirical methodology is preliminary and incomplete. Nevertheless, our suggestions may lead to the first operational attempts in the literature to gauge the separate effects of transaction costs, on the one hand, and capabilities, particularly firm-specific learning, on the other.
By comparison, Pak-Wai Liu and Xiaokai Yang (2000) propose a model of the firm that predicts that employment size of the firm will decrease if transaction costs are reduced relative to monitoring costs. However, they include no firm-specific learning effects. In contrast, our model predicts that reductions in employment size could result not only from relative reductions in transaction costs but also from increases in firm-specific learning. Lui and Yang present no clear evidence of a relative decline in transaction costs. Hence the data they present of diminishing firm size in major developed countries can just as well be interpreted as provisional support for a hypothesis that firm-specific learning has increased since the late 1970s. In the absence of, and the difficulty of obtaining, direct data on transaction costs, we suggest that a way of revealing the real cause of reductions in employment size of firms may be also to gather time-series data on learning.
Concluding Remarks
The burden of the argument here has been to show that there are good reasons for firms to exist even if (market based) transaction costs are zero or small. Our simple model demonstrates that static and dynamic learning effects, specific to the firm, can overcome any monitoring costs within the firm. By returning to the original Coasean and market-based conception of transaction costs, it is shown that alternative explanations for the existence of the firm, based on firm-specific learning, are possible. At the theoretical and conceptual level, this clearly opens the door to explanations of the nature and boundaries of the firm from a competence-based or capabilities perspective. It is suggested here that firms may exist for multiple reasons. This points to a 'hybrid' theory of the firm in which capabilities and transaction cost elements are combined. Some suggestions have been made towards an empirical methodology where the relative importance of capabilities and market-based transaction costs could be investigated in the real world.
A further consequence of our heuristic model is to underline a 'catch-all' danger in the transaction cost explanation, where everything relevant is lumped under the category of a 'transaction'. It is shown here that this approach not only breaks from the original conception of Coase (1937) but also leads eventually to unfalsifiable propositions that make empirical enquiry nugatory. Clearly, this would be a dogmatic and unsatisfactory outcome.
It should be added that the capabilities, or competence-based, literature on the firm also suffers from indiscriminate and often imprecise use of these concepts. Protagonists on both sides of the debate should consider more fully the possibility of hybrid explanations and address in more depth the methodological problems involved in the testing of rival approaches.
In the light of these arguments, theoretical and empirical claims concerning both transaction cost and capabilities explanations have to be restrained, at least until some further theoretical and methodological development occurs, and some extensive conjoint testing of rival hypotheses takes place. In the absence of these developments, it has to be admitted that both transaction cost and capabilities explanations for the existence of the firm are plausible, and the relatively importance of the two types of causal process involved is likely to vary in different historical and institutional contexts.
